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The (New) Ethics of Collaborative Law
By Scott R. Peppet
n an ancient parable-sometimes Hindu, sometimes
Buddhist, sometimes Sufi-a group of blind men exam-
ines an elephant. One touches the trunk and says that
an elephant is like a snake. One touches the legs and says
that an elephant is like a tree. One touches the tail and
says that an elephant is like a rope.
None is wrong, but none is right.
This article argues that we have subjected collabora-
tive law to a similar process, with a similar result.' There
are radically different understandings of what collabora-
tive law is, and therefore there remain fundamentally
opposed beliefs about whether it can comply with the legal
ethics rules. In February 2007, for example, the State of
Colorado's legal ethics committee issued Opinion 115,
which for the first time held that collaborative law cre-
ates a per se impermissible and unwaivable conflict of
interest for lawyers. Then, in August, the American Bar
Association's ethics committee issued Opinion 447,
which attempted to rebut Colorado's understanding and
argued that collaborative law creates no ethical problems.
In my view, neither of these opinions has it right-but
neither has it entirely wrong either. To understand why, we
must examine how these opinions characterize the collabo-
rative law process-what part of the elephant they were
examining. I argue that these committees understood the
process quite differently and thus reached very different
conclusions about its ethical implications. To help clean up
the mess they've left, I provide a taxonomy of contractual
arrangements that collaborative lawyers use in effecting
their practice and show that these different contractual
setups have different ethical consequences.
Most fundamentally, my goal is to warn collaborative
law practitioners against rejoicing prematurely about the
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ABA's Opinion 447 or assuming that it completely vindi-
cates their practice and frees them from ethical scrutiny.
Just the opposite. Careful analysis of both Opinion 115
and Opinion 447 underscores the need for collaborative
law practitioners to deepen their understanding of the
ethical complications of collaborative law and to make
modifications to lessen the ethical risks. The lesson of
2007 should be that in undertaking this ingenious experi-
ment, we need to be cautious, not careless, in order to
prevent more tumult and confusion.
Conflicting Opinions: Colorado's Opinion 115
and the ABA's Opinion 447
Prior to 2007, the ethics committees of five states-
Kentucky, Minnesota, New Jersey, North Carolina, and
Pennsylvania-had addressed the propriety of collaborative
law, and all had found it in compliance with their legal
ethics codes. Three states-California, North Carolina, and
Texas-had passed statutes codify-
ing the practice.' At the same
time, some practitioners and col-
laborative law scholars-myself
included-have expressed reserva-
tions about whether the practiceW hat is the
complies fully with the existing
rules of ethics.3
In February, however, the sense
of an emerging permissive consen-
sus came to an abrupt end. The
Colorado Bar Association's Ethics
Committee issued Opinion 115, opinion go
holding that collaborative law cre-
ates a per se conflict of interest
under Colorado's Rule 1.7.4 The
opinion focused on the "four-way
agreement" that is often signed at
the start of collaborative law
between the two lawyers and the two clients:
[t]he touchstone of Collaborative Law is an advance
agreement, often referred to as a "Four-Way Agreement"
or "Participation Agreement," entered into by the parties
and the lawyers in their individual capacities, which
requires the lawyers to terminate their representations in
the event the process is unsuccessful and the matter must
proceed to litigation.
Because of this contract, the committee found, "Collabor-
ative Law, by definition, involves an agreement between
the lawyer and a 'third person' (i.e., the opposing party)
whereby the lawyer agrees to impair his or her ability
to represent the client."6 This necessarily implicates
Colorado's conflict of interest rules, in particular Rule
1.7(b), which states that "[a] lawyer shall not represent a
client if the representation of that client may be material-
ly limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to ... a third
person," unless the lawyer reasonably believes that the rep-
resentation will not be adversely affected and the client
consents after consultation.7 Opinion 115 then found that
24 WINTER 2008 DISPUTE RESOLUTION MAGAZINE
the limitation on the lawyer's ability to go to court:
inevitably interferes with the lawyer's independent profes-
sional judgment in considering the alternative of litiga-
tion in a material way. Indeed, this course of action that
"reasonably should be pursued on behalf of the client," or
at least considered, is foreclosed to the lawyer.'
It therefore found a per se violation of Rule 1.7.
The dispute resolution community erupted in dissent,
arguing in print, on the Internet, and in conferences that
Opinion 115 was fundamentally misguided. Practitioners
feared that this was the beginning of a cascade of such
decisions.
Just six months after Opinion 115 was released, the
American Bar Association's Standing Committee on
Ethics and Professional Responsibility issued a response-
its own Formal Opinion 447, titled "Ethical Considera-
tions in Collaborative Law Practice." Opinion 447
rejected the Colorado commit-
tee's conclusions and held that
the practice creates no impermis-
sible conflict.
Instead, Opinion 447 argued
that although a four-way agree-
process of ment does create obligations to a
third person on the part of each
live law, lawyer, such obligations create no
conflict if they do not "materially
limit the lawyer's representation of
the client."' It then concluded that
a collaborative law four-way agree-
it ment disqualifying each lawyer in
the event either client proceeds to
litigation does not so "materially
limit" the lawyers' service because
each collaborative lawyer's repre-
sentation is already limited in scope
to settlement, and thus the four-
way does not further limit that representation:
When a client has given informed consent to a represen-
tation limited to collaborative negotiation toward settle-
ment, the lawyer's agreement to withdraw if the
collaboration fails is not an agreement that impairs her
ability to represent the client, but rather is consistent
with the client's limited goals for the representation."
In other words, "no conflict arises" under Rule 1.7:
"there is no foreclosing of alternatives ... otherwise
available to the client because the client has specifically lim-
ited the scope of the lawyer's representation to the collaborative
negotiation of a settlement."'
This is a very different understanding of the process
from that of the Colorado committee. Colorado's Opinion
115 is premised on one understanding of the collaborative
law process-that the process is effected by a four-way
contract, signed by both lawyers and both clients, that
includes disqualification; that the lawyers enter that con-
tract in their "individual capacities" (that they are, in
short, in privity); and that this four-way contract is the
only effecting document. In other words, what the
Colorado opinion found suspect was a situation in which
the only agreement in play was a four-way contract.
The ABA, on the other hand, describes a different ele-
phant. Its analysis turns on the assumption that in addition
to the four-way agreement, there is a separate limited
retention or limited scope agreement in place between
each lawyer and his or her client. As understood by the
ABA, in other words, collaborative lawyers get informed
consent from their clients to limit the scope of their rep-
resentation to settlement, and then sign a four-way docu-
ment that simply reaffirms that preexisting commitment.
It thus found no ethical problem-because it was looking
at a very different contractual scenario from that consid-
ered by Colorado's committee.
A Taxonomy of Contractual Arrangements
So, which is it? What is the process of collaborative law,
and, thus, which opinion got it right? The answer to this
question is surprisingly complicated. Although many
scholars and practitioners have
long assumed that we understood
the elephant accurately, I am
now convinced that we have all
been recognizing only parts of Are the
the whole.
As the collaborative law
process has evolved, collaborative
lawyers have created a disparate
array of contractual arrangements p es in
to give it force. To understand
the conflict between these com- is an intri
peting ethics opinions-and to
bring clarity to how collaborative vexing,
lawyers should practice going
forward-I believe we must begin
to see these very different arrange-
ments distinctly. Here I lay out
three fundamentally different scenarios, some
with multiple variations, which are all currently
called "collaborative law."
First, in a Retention Agreements Only scenario, the two
lawyer-client pairs reach limited retention agreements
that include a provision making attorney withdrawal
mandatory in the event that either party proceeds to
court. They do not sign a four-way agreement, however.
Thus, if one party litigates, both lawyers can (and should)
withdraw. Note, however, that if Lawyer B and Client B
decide to go to court together anyway, there is nothing
that Lawyer A or Client A can do. They have reached
only "behind the table" lawyer-client agreements; there is
no enforceable "across the table" contract that the "A"
side could use to enforce the collaborative law commit-
ment to withdrawal.
Second, in a Retention Agreements Plus Four-Way sce-
nario, the lawyers and clients create limited retention
agreements similar to those in a Retention Agreements
Only situation, but they also sign a four-way document.
There are, however, several variations in practice of this
four-way:
- It may be a process four-way, containing only process
terms such as commitments to disclosure, honesty, com-
munication norms, etc., or a disqualification four-way, con-
taining the mandatory attorney withdrawal language.
e It may be contractual, clearly intended as a binding set
of contractual obligations giving rise to the possibility of
liability or injunction, or hortative, intended instead as a
statement of non-binding principle or belief, rather than
legal obligation.
e If and only if it is contractual in nature, it may represent
an intent to bind the clients only, where only the clients
and not their lawyers are contracting parties, or to include
lawyers in privity, where the attorneys are in privity either
with each other or with the opposing client, or both, and
thus contractually bound by the agreement.
These three variables give rise to very different docu-
ments, with very different consequences. Many collabora-
tive lawyers, for example, seem
to practice in a "Retention
Agreements Plus Hortative
Disqualification Four-Way"
attorneys arrangement. They sign limited
retention agreements with their
nitratual respective clients and then a four-way with the other side, but the
four-way does not use contractualpriviy? Tils language. These four-ways are
often titled "Principles and
Guidelines for the Practice of
Collaborative Law" and are
phrased as such rather than as
contracts. These hortative four-
ways do not contain various terms
one would expect in a contract-
such as choice of law, jurisdiction-
al, damages, or dispute resolution provisions-nor do they
sound like contracts.
Neither the ABA's nor Colorado's analysis applies
squarely to this form of collaborative law practice. If the
parties sign a hortative four-way, then no formal contractual
conflict of interest arises-the lawyers have not taken on
contractual obligations to the other side. Instead, the
process rests entirely on the limited retention agreements.
The relevant ethical question is whether those limited
retention agreements have complied with Model Rule 1.2's
requirements for scope reduction agreements-whether, in
short, there is true informed consent. Conflicts of interest
are not the salient issue. Unfortunately, neither Colorado's
Opinion 115 nor the ABAs Opinion 447 discussed compli-
ance with Rule 1.2 in detail.
Other collaborative lawyers, however, do seem to
intend their four-way agreements as contractual, and
some may even intend for both the lawyers and clients to
be in privity to those contracts. The Collaborative Law
DISPUTE RESOLUTION MAGAZINE WINTER 2008 25
Alliance of New Hampshire's model four-way form, for
example, is titled "Agreement to the Principles and
Guidelines of Collaborative Law," and it contains more
contractual language than the four-ways discussed above.3
The Cincinnati Academy of Collaborative Professionals
uses a form titled "Collaboration Contract," which states
that "[t]he Participants agree to be bound by the terms of
this Contract." 4 Although I have not completed my search,
I have also found other agreements that seem clearly
intended to be contractual rather than hortative.
What difference does it make? First, a contractual four-
way gives rise to the ability for Lawyer A or Client A to
force Lawyer B and Client B to live up to their collabora-
tive commitments. If Lawyer B and Client B decide to
revise their understanding and go to court together, the
"A" side can sue on the four-way
contract. Gaining this feature,
however, comes with increased
ethical risk-by signing an agree-
ment with the other side, the Neither Col
lawyers create the possibility of a
formal conflict of interest if the the ABA con
lawyers are in privity.
Are the attorneys truly con-
tractual parties in privity? This is ethics of a
an intriguing, and vexing, ques-
tion. I have found only one col- agreemei
laborative law four-way agreement
that explicitly discusses lawyer structure. In
privity, and it states that "[t]his
Collaboration Contract does not
create any legal rights or privity of on
contract between the non-client
Participant and the other attor- agreen
ney."1 Note, however, that this
does not disclaim the possibility of
privity between the lawyers-just
that there is no privity between a
lawyer and the client on the other side. Most four-way
agreements appear to be silent on this question."
To the extent that the lawyers are in privity to a con-
tractual four-way disqualification agreement, that suggests
the somewhat bizarre possibility that a lawyer could sue on
the contract-even without his or her client's support-to dis-
qualify the other lawyer. If Lawyer B and Client B decided
to break the four-way agreement and go to court together,
and even if Client A found this acceptable, Lawyer A
would have an independent contractual right against the
"B" side. Although the notion of a lawyer having such
power independent of her client is unsettling, it is a real
possibility if collaborative lawyers use a contractual, lawyer-
privity four-way document-and one that those lawyers
should be disclosing to their clients as part of getting their
clients' informed consent to the process.
This brings us to a third distinct understanding of col-
laborative law, which I call a Four-Way Only scenario.
Here, no separate limited retention agreements exist-
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the parties only sign a four-way. Again, that four-way may
concern only process or also disqualification, may be horta-
tive or contractual, and may be clients-only or include
lawyers in privity. These distinctions matter a great deal for
the ethical analysis. As already stated, the Colorado commit-
tee characterized the collaborative law process as involving
only a four-way document, and it assumed both that such an
agreement was contractual and that the lawyers would be par-
ties to it. It found this a per se conflict of interest. At the
same time, Colorado's Opinion 115 also stated clearly that a
process-rather than disqualification-four-way only sce-
nario, otherwise known as "Cooperative Law," complies with
the ethics rules. It also stated that a client-only (no lawyers)
agreement for disqualification also raises no ethical prob-
lem." It thus acknowledged that the issue is attorneys bind-
ing themselves to disqualification
four-ways-not the remainder of
these contractual structures.
Neither Colorado nor the ABA
orado nor considered the ethics of a "reten-
tion agreements only" structure.
sidered the Instead, both focused on four-wayagreements. Collaborative law cer-
tainly can be practiced in thisretention form, however, and with less ethi-
cal risk than with a contractual
its ofour-way.
stad both What's Next?
This taxonomy of contractual
arrangements-all commonlyfour-way understood as "collaborative
law"-reveals the source of ourients. confusion about the ethics of this
process. Both the Colorado ethics
committee and the American Bar
Association looked at one type of
contractual arrangement and pro-
nounced it acceptable or unacceptable. Each, however,
missed the complex reality that exists in practice. Neither
opinion therefore provides complete guidance for collabora-
tive lawyers, nor should either be considered the "last word"
on the ethics of this dispute resolution process.
One can glean certain things from the two opinions
taken together, however, that should help collaborative
lawyers going forward.
First, collaborative lawyers need to reconsider which
contractual structure they have employed and whether it
best suits their goals and their clients' needs. Many collabo-
rative lawyers seem not to have thought about whether
their disqualification or withdrawal provision is in a robust
lawyer-client limited retention agreement or in a four-way,
and why. Few seem to have consciously chosen a hortative
or contractual four-way, or dealt explicitly with the issue of
lawyer privity. These differences matter. Until the collabora-
tive law community addresses these variations head-on and
practitioners decide which arrangements they really need in
order to effect their goals, they run the risk of landing in
ethical trouble unnecessarily.
Second, I believe that Opinion 115 and Opinion 447
each had it partly right. Colorado's committee was clearly
correct in saying that a client-to-client agreement (with sep-
arate lawyer-client limited retention agreements) presents
fewer ethical risks than a "four-way only" scenario in which
the four-way is a disqualification, contractual, lawyer-privity
document. The latter is, in my view, a terrible structure, and
one that I would avoid. Why the Colorado committee
focused on that structure exclusively, I cannot say, but it
doesn't much matter: some collaborative lawyers are practic-
ing using a "four-way only" arrangement, and that is unwise.
The ABA's Opinion 447 also provides useful hints of the
way forward. The opinion clarifies that the ABA believes
even a contractual four-way document is permissible so long
as the disqualification language within it parallels identical
language already agreed upon by each lawyer and her client
in a limited retention contract. In short, a limited retention
document can moot the conflict of interest problems pre-
sented by the "four-way only" arrangement considered by the
Colorado committee.
Unfortunately, the ABAs Opinion 447 is unnecessarily
confusing about just what is required for this "solution"
to work properly. It does not discuss limited retention agree-
ments in any detail and leaves unanswered such basic ques-
tions as (1) whether agreements must be in writing in the
collaborative law context; (2) whether a four-way document
can itself constitute the limited retention agreement, or
whether separate documents are needed; and (3) whether a
disqualifying limited retention agreement must be in place
prior to the signing of a contractual four-way in order to ame-
liorate conflict of interest concerns. I cannot address all of
these shortcomings here. It must suffice to say that while I
agree with Opinion 447's general argument, I would urge
collaborative law practitioners to carefully review their limit-
ed retention agreements and to focus on whether they have
documented informed consent to those important lawyer-
client arrangements. If nothing else, the conflict between
Opinion 115 and Opinion 447 teaches us that collaborative
law is a creature of contract, and that it is ultimately depend-
ent on the validity of these limited retention agreements.
Third, and finally, 2007 teaches us that collaborative
law is neither dead nor completely in the ethical clear. The
practice is innovative and ingenious, and provides great
benefits. It is also complex, and in some instances I believe
that its practitioners have "let the car outrun the head-
lights." As shown, some of the contractual structures in use
should be reconsidered and revised to make the practice
more consistent, and more clearly compliant, with the legal
ethics rules.
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